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OPINION OF THE COURT
                              
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
Plaintiffs ITT Corporation (“ITT
Corp.”), ITT Sheraton Corporation
(“Sheraton”) and Starwood Hotels and
Resorts Worldwide, Inc. (“Starwood”)
appeal the District Court’s dismissal of
their Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act (“RICO”) action against
various Intelnet entities1 for failure to
comply with the applicable statute of
limitations.  ITT’s RICO claims allege that
Intelnet has engaged in a pattern of
entering into contracts it cannot perform
with the intent of seizing upon its
customers’ purported breaches to extort
settlements by threats of vexatious
litigation.  Prior to initiating its federal
action, ITT raised substantially identical
claims in a state court case by means of a
motion to amend its pleadings.  The state
court denied the motion.  
On cross-appeal, Intelnet argues
that the District Court erred in holding that
it had jurisdiction, as the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine “preclude[s] lower federal court
jurisdiction over claims that were actually
litigated or ‘inextricably intertwined’ with
adjudication by a state’s courts.” Parkview
Assocs. P’shp. v. City of Lebanon, 225
F.3d 321, 325 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting
Gulla v. North Strabane Township, 146
F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 1998)).  We agree
with Intelnet that Rooker-Feldman bars
federal jurisdiction in this case. 
I. Factual and Procedural History
ITT Corp. owns and operates hotels
and casinos.2  Its affiliates include
Sheraton and Caesar’s World, Inc.
(“Caesar’s”).  Intelnet International Corp.
(“Intelnet International”), Intelnet Services
of North America, Inc. (“Intelnet
Services”), INNtraport International, Inc.,
Intelecable N.A., Inc., and Intelemedia
    1Unless the context requires otherwise,
for convenience purposes we use “ITT”
when referring to any ITT-related entity or
entities on the one hand, and “Intelnet”
when referring to any Intelnet-related
entity or entities on the other. 
    2In February 1998, ITT Corp. became a
wholly owned subsidiary of Starwood.
3N.A., Inc. purchase telephone services in
volume from major carriers and resell
those services to hotels and hotel
companies, as well as residential
customers, at a reduced rate. 
In 1996, ITT and Intelnet entered
into a series of contracts for Intelnet’s
provision of telecommunications and
media services to ITT’s hotels and casinos.
Intelnet represented that it would provide
to ITT a proprietary system called the
“Intelnet Platform,” which it claimed
would provide enhanced services such as
high-speed internet access and video-on-
demand.  The principal contracts were the
C +  Ope ra t ing  Ag reeme nt  ( “C +
Agreement”), dated July 3, 1996, and the
A m e n d e d  a n d  R e s t a te d M as te r
Promotional Agreement (“RMPA”), dated
October 3, 1996. 
The C+ Agreement formed a
limited liability company, Concierge Plus,
L.L .C.,   through which Intelnet
International and ITT Intelnet Investment
Corp., a wholly owned subsidiary of ITT
Corp., would share future profits and
Intelnet International would provide
telecommunications products and services.
But Concierge Plus never provided any of
the promised services.  The RMPA, a
contract between ITT Corp. and Intelnet
Services, gave the latter the exclusive right
t o  p r o v i d e  c e r t a i n  e n h a n c e d
telecommunications products and services,
including high-speed internet access, to the
offices, hotels, and casinos of ITT Corp.
and several of its affiliates.  
In December 1997 Intelnet filed an
action in New Jersey state court against
ITT for breach of contract.3  Intelnet
alleged that in early 1997 Sheraton began
working with other companies, such as
Microsoft Corporation, to develop
Sheraton.Net, which would service
Sheraton hotel guests in Asia.  Intelnet
argued that the negotiations between
Sheraton and Microsoft breached the C+
Agreement and the RMPA.4  
In February 1998 ITT filed various
state law counterclaims against Intelnet,
including fraud, misrepresentation, and
breach of contract.  Some time later, based
purportedly upon information obtained
through discovery in the New Jersey state
court action and through its independent
investigation, ITT filed a motion to amend
its pleadings to add counterclaims against
Intelnet under the federal and New Jersey
RICO statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) & (d)
and N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:41-2(c) & (d).
The proposed counterclaims asserted that
Intelnet had engaged in a pattern of
racketeering activity by entering into
contracts, knowing that it was incapable of
performing them, with the intent of
extorting settlements from its customers by
    3Intelnet initially named as defendants
only ITT Corp. and Sheraton.  The
complaint was later amended to include
Starwood as well as various affiliates.  
    4According to ITT, Intelnet had advised
ITT that it could not perform in Asia.  ITT
also notes that Sheraton.Net was never
implemented.  We need not examine the
viability of Intelnet’s claim for breach of
contract, which is irrelevant to our
disposition of this appeal. 
4threatening to entangle them in extensive
and costly litigation based on their
purported breaches.  The State Court, per
Judge John A. Fratto, denied the motion to
amend.  Judge Fratto explained:
The ru le  says  that
amendments to pleadings
should be freely given. The
rule provides that there be a
motion in order to obtain the
amendment to the pleading,
so it does not mean that you
are automatically entitled to
amend the pleadings at any
time. . . . Whether it be
RICO or some other cause
of action, there are judges .
. . that will allow all
amendments on the theory
that they can be dealt with
later on when the other side
makes  a  motion  for
summ ary judgment, a
motion to dismiss[], motion
to strike the pleadings. That
h a s  n o t  b e e n  m y
procedure. . . .
I’ve looked at the
proposed amendments . . .
and at best it seems that the
allegation is . . . that the
plaintiffs were unable to
fulfill their contract, and
every time they wrote a
letter or sent a wire,
knowing that they were
unable to fulfill their
contract, the[y] committed a
RICO violation.
I don’t think RICO is or was
intended to encompass
breaches of contract, even
breaches of contract that
involve $800 million. . . .
And, I don’t see sufficient in
the proposed complaint that
I should permit after three
and a half years an
amendment to an answer to
raise a RICO claim with all
of its concomitant results[;]
so the motion to amend the
answer will be denied.
Judge Fratto’s accompanying Order did
not specify whether ITT’s motion was
denied with or without prejudice.  ITT
suggests that the motion was denied
without prejudice because it was filed
three and one half years after the
complaint.  Intelnet, by contrast, contends
that the state court also rejected the motion
on the merits and therefore it was with
prejudice.
ITT filed this action in the United
States District Court for the District of
New Jersey in November 2001.  Its
complaint states that “it only was after
discovery commenced in the New Jersey
Litigation . . . that the ITT Parties
discovered that the Intelnet Parties had no
ability or intent to perform under Intelnet’s
contract with the ITT Parties, and further,
that the Intelnet parties had a history of
engaging in this pattern of fraudulent
conduct and racketeering activity.”  ITT
also alleges a  variety of  false
representations by Intelnet regarding its
capabilities, describes evidence of
Intelnet’s “extortionate objectives,” and
5lists numerous acts of alleged mail and
wire fraud.  In essence, ITT’s federal
action raises the same claims it sought to
introduce in the New Jersey case before
Judge Fratto.5  
In February 2002, Intelnet filed a
motion to dismiss ITT’s federal complaint
based on the four-year statute of
limitations.  The District Court granted
Intelnet’s motion.  In so doing, the Court
applied the two-step “injury discovery”
rule set out in Mathews v. Kidder, Peabody
& Co., Inc., 260 F.3d 239, 250 (3d Cir.
2001).  It concluded that Intelnet had met
its burden of demonstrating the existence
of “storm warnings” more than four years
prior to the initiation of the federal action
(specifically, as early as January 1997).  It
further determined that ITT had failed to
show that it was unable to discover its
injuries, despite exercising due diligence,
within the applicable period. 
ITT appeals on the bases that: (1)
the District Court misconstrued the nature
of its RICO claims, which were founded
on extortion through threat of litigation
rather than fraudulent inducement; (2) the
District Court relied on information
extrinsic to the pleadings, thereby
converting Intelnet’s motion to dismiss
into a motion for summary judgment
without providing notice of conversion;
and (3) ITT did in fact act with reasonable
diligence subsequent to the “storm
warnings” cited by the District Court.
Intelnet cross-appeals, alleging that the
District Court lacked jurisdiction in light
of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine or should
have abstained from exercising jurisdiction
under the Colorado River doctrine.6
    5To illustrate, the federal complaint of
ITT alleges that: (1) Intelnet had “an
extensive history of entangling their
customers and vendors in contracts that the
Intelnet Companies could not perform,
with the ultimate goal of seizing upon a
pretextual breach of contract by the
contracting party to extort a settlement
payment from them under the threat of
protracted and expensive litigation,” (2)
that the strategy of extortion was integral
to Intelnet’s business strategy, and (3) that
ITT, through discovery, had identified
many similar lawsuits.  In its prior state
court counterclaim, ITT alleged that “the
Intelnet parties used the U.S. Mail as a
critical part of their scheme to defraud the
ITT parties, all in order to . . . wait until
the Intelnet parties could seize upon some
pretext to declare that the ITT parties had
breached their agreements with Intelnet
and then sue the ITT parties for an
extraordinary sum of money (hundreds of
millions of dollars) unless the ITT parties
paid the Intelnet [sic] exorbitant sums.”
    6While “[i]t is axiomatic that the federal
courts have a ‘virtually unflagging
obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction
given them’ by Congress,” Ryan v.
Johnson, 115 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 1997)
(quoting Colo. River Water Conservation
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817
(1976)), the Colorado River doctrine
permits a federal court to refrain from
exercising its jurisdiction when the
litigation would be duplicative of a
concurrent foreign or state court
proceeding.  Because the lower federal
6Intelnet also argues that ITT has failed to
plead its RICO claims with sufficient
particularity.  As the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine bars federal jurisdiction in this
case, we go no further.
II. Discussion
A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine as
Interpreted in the Third Circuit
Our Court’s boundaries for
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine are pinched
indeed.  See, e.g., Parkview Assocs. P’ship
v. City of Lebanon, 225 F.3d 321, 326 (3d
Cir. 2000).  Nonetheless, the facts of this
case point to its application here.  
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars
f e d e r a l  j u r i s d ic t i o n  u n d er  tw o
circumstances: if the claim was “actually
litigated” in state court or if the claim is
“inextricably intertwined” with the state
adjudication.  Desi’s Pizza, Inc. v. City of
Wilkes-Barre, 321 F.3d 411, 419 (3d Cir.
2003);  Parkview Assocs., 225 F.3d at
325.7  Our discussion examines whether a
District Court judgment in favor of ITT on
the RICO claims would be inextricably
intertwined with the state court litigation.
Only one prong of the test need be
satisfied to trigger Rooker-Feldman, and
we struggle to conjure a scenario in which
a claim would be “actually litigated” by a
state court and yet federal litigation of the
same claim would not be “inextricably
intertwined” with the state court
judgment.8  The “actually litigated” test is
courts lack jurisdiction in this case under
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we need not
address whether abstention would be
appropriate. 
    7Habeas corpus petitions are, of course,
an exception to the Rooker-Feldman
jurisdictional bar.  Blake v. Papadakos,
953 F.2d 68, 72 n.2 (3d Cir. 1992)
(quoting Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539,
543-44 (1981)).
    8In Desi’s Pizza, we noted the factors
for determining whether an issue was
“actually litigated” by the state courts: a
plaintiff must present its federal claims to
the state court, and the state court must
decide those claims.  Id. at 419. 
Ordinarily, it will be more difficult to
demonstrate that a claim was “actually
litigated” than to show that the federal
claim is “inextricably intertwined” with
the state court judgment.  The former
requires that the state court has considered
and decided precisely the same claim that
the plaintiff has presented in the federal
court.  Conversely, two claims may
proceed on different theories or involve
different parties and yet be inextricably
intertwined if the District Court’s
judgment would “prevent a state court
from enforcing its orders.”  Id. at 422. 
The actually litigated prong is
principally useful where the claims before
the state and federal courts are in all
respects identical.  In such cases, the
straightforward application of the “actually
litigated” test avoids the more complicated
“inextricably intertwined” inquiry.  See,
e.g., Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. v. Exxon
Corp., No. 02-2130, ___ F.3d ___ (3d Cir.
2004). 
7a recent development unique to our Court,9
and it is potentially misleading in this case
because of its close relationship to the
concepts of claim and issue preclusion. 
See, e.g., Ivy Club v. Edwards, 943 F.2d
270, 294 (3d Cir. 1991) (“A party is
precluded from litigating in a subsequent
proceeding both claims that it actually
litigated and claims that it could have
litigated in an earlier proceeding.”)
(citation omitted)).  Whereas the term
“inextricably intertwined” has been
integral to Rooker-Feldman doctrine since
its inception, Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486,
the term “actually litigated” derives from
the preclusion context.10 
State and federal claims are
inextricably intertwined “(1) ‘when in
order to grant the federal plaintiff the relief
sought, the federal court must determine
that the state court judgment was
erroneously entered’ [or]11 (2) when ‘the
federal court must . . . take action that
would render [the state court’s] judgment
ineffectual.’” Desi’s Pizza, 321 F.3d at 421
(quoting FOCUS v. Allegheny Cty. Court
of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 840 (3d
Cir. 1996)).  “If the relief requested in the
federal action requires determining that the
state court’s decision is wrong or would
void the state court’s ruling, then the
issues are inextricably intertwined and the
district court has no subject matter
jurisdiction to hear the suit.”  FOCUS, 75
F.3d at 840 (quoting Charchenkov v. City
of Stillwater, 47 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir.
1995)).   
    9In Parkview Associates, 225 F.3d at
325, we briefly inquired whether the state
court had “actually litigated” the claims at
issue.  We are not aware of the term’s use
in any prior discussion by our Court of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  Other courts
have occasionally invoked Rooker-
Feldman and the “actually litigated” test in
the same breath.  See, e.g., Kropelnicki v.
Siegel, 290 F.3d 118, 128 (2d Cir. 2002)
(noting that “[i]n addition to claims that
were actually litigated in state court, the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars lower
federal courts from exercising jurisdiction
over claims that are ‘inextricably
i n t e r t w i n e d ’  w i t h  s t a t e  c o u r t
determinations,” but discussing only the
latter).  To our knowledge, however, none
has established a formal “actually
litigated” alternative under the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine. 
    10The Restatement (Second) of
Judgments, § 27, defines issue preclusion
with reference to actual litigation: “When
an issue of fact or law is actually litigated
and determined by a valid and final
judgment, and the determination is
e s sent ia l t o t he  judgment ,  the
determination is conclusive in a
subsequent action between the parties,
whether on the same or a different claim.”
Comment d. to § 27 defines the term
“actually litigated” for preclusion
purposes: “When an issue is properly
raised, by the pleadings or otherwise, and
is submitted for determination and is
determined, the issue is actually litigated.”
    11The passage in Desi’s Pizza reads
“and” rather than “or.”  The Court,
however, considered the two tests in the
alternative.
8In assessing whether the claims
here are inextricably intertwined, we must
resolve whether the state court decided
ITT’s RICO claims on the merits.  If we
conclude that Judge Fratto did not decide
(or should not have decided) the merits of
ITT’s RICO claims, then federal judgment
for ITT would neither render the state
court’s remaining judgment—namely, the
denial of the motion to amend based on
balancing the sufficiency of the proposed
c l a i m  w i t h  I T T ’ s  d e l a y  i n
filing12—necessarily erroneous nor
ineffectual.  Gulla v. North Strabane
Township, 146 F.3d 168, 172–73 (3d Cir.
1998).  Conversely, if we conclude that the
state court did resolve the claims on the
merits, then the state and federal claims
would be “inextricably intertwined” (as
well as “actually litigated”).  A contrary
decision by a federal court on an issue
resolved on the merits by a state court is
precisely the brand of federal appellate
review that Rooker-Feldman is intended to
prevent. 
B. What Did the State Court Hold and
Did It Intend That Holding To Be on the
Merits?
“ [T]h e  f i r st  s te p  i n  a
Rooker-Feldman analysis is to determine
exactly what the state court held.” Gulla,
146 F.3d at 171 (internal quotation
omitted).  Unfortunately, the order denying
ITT’s motion for leave to file its amended
counterclaims is of limited usefulness on
this score.  Thus we devote substantial
attention to the transcript of the motion
hearing before Judge Fratto.  
There can be little doubt that ITT
presented its RICO claims to the state
court.  In its “First Amended Answers and
First Amended Counterclaims,” ITT
devoted more than fifty pages to its state
and federal RICO claims.  In denying the
motion to amend, Judge Fratto explicitly
addressed both the substantive allegations
(“I don’t think RICO is or was intended to
encompass breaches of contract”) and
ITT’s delay in filing its motion (“And, I
don’t see sufficient in the proposed
complaint that I should permit after three
and a half years an amendment”).13  He
differentiated himself from those judges
who “allow all amendments on the theory
that they can be dealt with later on.”  In
short, Judge Fratto intended to dispose of
the motion on the merits.14 
    12See infra note 13. 
    13Arguably, even the language
pertaining to delay reflects a judgment on
the merits.  Judge Fratto did not simply
deny the amendment based on delay.
Rather, he emphasized that the proposed
complaint was insufficient to warrant a
late amendment.  Of course, as discussed
below, Judge Fratto’s intent to dispose of
the amendment on the merits will not
alone trigger the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine; if he should not have reached the
merits, Rooker-Feldman does not apply. 
    14Whether Judge Fratto’s conclusion is
correct as a matter of federal law is, of
course, irrelevant for Rooker-Feldman
purposes.  The underlying rationale of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine is to prevent the
lower federal courts from reviewing state
court decisions in an appellate capacity. 
9In addition to the statements made
by Judge Fratto, comments made by
counsel at the motion hearing support this
view.  For example, counsel for ITT
argued that because it needed to develop
the facts, it was entitled to discovery.  He
noted that, if ITT were permitted to amend
its pleadings, Intelnet could “bring [a]
multiplicity of summary and partial
summary judgment motions.”  ITT would
then bear the burden of demonstrating that
“a reasonable juror could conclude from
the activities and facts deduced that
litigation, both in this case and in other
cases, was entered into with the absolute
understanding by the plaintiffs that it was
spurious and was done simply as a method
of extorting goods or services.”  Implicit in
this line of reasoning is the possibility that
Judge Fratto could dismiss the amendment
on legal grounds.  Significantly, ITT’s
counsel referenced Intelnet’s argument
“that we are precluded as a matter of law
this morning from such allegations”
(emphasis added).  
From this we glean that ITT
recognized that denial of the amendment
on the merits was possible.  Moreover,
counsel for Intelnet clearly promoted the
position that ITT could not make out a
RICO claim based on extortionate
litigation.  He referenced Intelnet’s
argument “that the commencement of a
lawsuit . . . does not in any way arguably
constitute RICO as a matter of law”
(emphasis added).  He deemed it
unnecessary to “get into the facts . . . at
this point in time.”  There was virtually no
discussion before Judge Fratto of the
timeliness of ITT’s motion to amend.
Instead, oral argument focused almost
exclusively on the viability of the claims.
While Judge Fratto’s reference to
the merits in his final disposition of the
motion was limited, a state court’s brevity
does not prevent application of Rooker-
Feldman.  Gulla, 146 F.3d at 172 (“If a
state court considers and rejects a
constitutional claim on the merits, a
paucity of explicit analysis in the court’s
opinion will not strip the holding of its
validity for purposes of Rooker-Feldman’s
jurisdictional bar.”). 
C. Would New Jersey Law Regard the
State Court’s Judgment As Properly on
the Merits?
Judge Fratto’s intent alone,
however, will not support application of
Rooker-Feldman.  ITT might avoid
application of the doctrine if it can
establish that (1) Judge Fratto’s denial of
the motion to amend would not be
recognized as an adjudication on the
merits under New Jersey law (and
therefore does not constitute a state court
judgment for Rooker-Feldman purposes),
or (2) Judge Fratto should not have
considered the merits of the amendment
under New Jersey law.  We consider these
issues in turn. 
1. Is the Denial of a Motion to Amend
That Does Not Specify Whether It Is
with Prejudice Nonetheless a Decision
on the Merits Under New Jersey Law?
The first potential argument for
evading Rooker-Feldman is that Judge
Fratto’s order denying ITT’s motion to
10
amend would not be regarded as deciding
the merits under state law.  ITT suggests
that an order denying a motion to amend is
without prejudice, and thereby not on the
merits, in the absence of explicit language
to the contrary.  We conclude otherwise. 
If the state court’s denial of ITT’s
motion to amend its pleadings was “with
prejudice,” and therefore on the merits, the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes ITT
from filing substantially the same claims
in the federal courts by withholding
jurisdiction from those courts.  New Jersey
case law does not address explicitly
whether a denial of a motion to amend is
with prejudice when the judgment does not
so specify.  We resolve the question by
deductive reasoning based on the
following propositions.  
First, “[o]bjection to the filing of an
amended complaint on the ground that it
fails to state a cause of action should be
determined by the same standard
applicable to a motion to dismiss. . . .”
Interchange State Bank v. Rinaldi, 696
A.2d 744, 752 (N.J. App. Div. 1997). 
Second, under New Jersey law an
order granting a motion to dismiss that
does not state whether it is with prejudice
is “on the merits” except under limited
circumstances not applicable here.  New
Jersey Rule 4:37-2(d) provides: “Unless
the order of dismissal otherwise specifies,
a dismissal under R. 4:37-2(b) or (c) and
any dismissal not specifically provided for
by R. 4:37, other than a dismissal for lack
of jurisdiction, operate[] as . . .
adjudication[s] on the merits.”  Rule 4:37-
2(a) carves out another exception for
disciplinary dismissals.15  Thus a dismissal
that is not jurisdictional or disciplinary is
on the merits.   
Reviewing the first two predicates,
an objection to a motion to amend for
failure to state a cause of action is treated
like a motion to dismiss, and a motion to
dismiss is governed by a certain set of
rules—namely, the dismissal is on the
merits unless (1) it states that it is without
prejudice or (2) it is jurisdictional or
disciplinary.  We may conclude that denial
of an amendment for failure to state a
cause of action is governed by the same set
of rules.16  Therefore, if the order denying
    15That rule provides: “For failure of the
plaintiff to cause a summons to issue
within 15 days from the date of the Track
Assignment Notice or to comply with
these rules or any order of court, the court
in its discretion may on defendant’s
motion dismiss an action or any claim
against the defendant. Such a dismissal
shall be without prejudice unless otherwise
specified in the order.”  While ITT seeks
to apply the exception to this case, no basis
exists to do so.  Rule 4:37-2(a) extends
only to the dismissal of a claim as a court-
i m p o s e d  s a n c t io n ,  a  p r i n c ip l e
acknowledged by ITT in its own letter
brief.  See, e.g., Woodward-Clyde
Consultants v. Chem. & Pollution Scis.,
523 A.2d 131, 134 (1987); Zaccardi v.
Becker, 440 A.2d 1329, 1333 (1982). 
    16Our reasoning approximates what in
logic is termed a “hypothetical syllogism”:
if A implies B, and B implies C, then A
implies C.  See Ruggero J. Aldisert, Logic
11
the amendment is silent as to its prejudicial
value, the denial is on the merits unless it
is jurisdictional or disciplinary.  As we
explain in the next section, Judge Fratto
denied ITT’s amendment because it failed
to state a claim as a matter of law.  His
order did not specify whether it was with
prejudice, but neither was it jurisdictional
or disciplinary.  It thus qualifies under
New Jersey law as an “adjudication on the
merits.”17 
for Lawyers: A Guide to Clear Legal
Thinking 159 & n.7 (3d ed. 1997).
    17New Jersey case law explaining the
preclusive effect of a dismissal for failure
to state a claim is somewhat confusing.
Even if we concluded that Judge Fratto’s
judgment was without prejudice, it might
still be on the merits.  While a dismissal
with prejudice clearly constitutes an
adjudication on the merits, a dismissal
without prejudice only “indicates,” as a
general matter, that there has been no
adjudication on the merits of the claim.
Velasquez v. Franz, 589 A.2d 143, 148
(N.J. 1991); Cornblatt v. Barow, 708 A.2d
401, 413 (N.J. 1998).    
Per New Jersey’s Supreme Court in
Woodward-Clyde, 523 A.2d at 135, “[a]
dismissal without prejudice is not an
adjudication on the merits and does not bar
reinstitution of the same claim in a later
action.”  Yet in Zaccardi v. Becker, 440
A.2d 1329, 1333 (N.J. 1982), the same
Court implied that a dismissal without
prejudice of a complaint may later be a
basis for dismissing a subsequently filed
complaint.  The Court attempted to resolve
these tensions in Cornblatt, 708 A.2d at
415, suggesting that, while it may be
without prejudice, dismissal for failure to
state a claim is nonetheless “an
adjudication on the merits entitled to res
judicata effect.”  Moreover, in Mystic Isle
Development Corp. v. Perskie & Nehmad,
662 A.2d 523, 534 (N.J. 1995), the Court
emphasized that Woodward-Clyde
involved a defendant whose counterclaim
was dismissed without prejudice for failure
to comply with a discovery order—an
adjudication wholly unrelated to the
merits. 
Whether a claim is dismissed on
factual or legal grounds is relevant to its
preclusive effect.  For example, the New
Jersey Supreme Court has cautioned that
applications for dismissal under Rule 4:6-
2(e) for failure of a complaint to state a
claim “should be granted in only the rarest
of instances.  If a complaint must be
dismissed after it has been accorded . . .
m e t i c u l o u s  a n d  i n d u l g e n t
examination, then, barring any other
impediment such as a statute of
limitations, the dismissal should be
without prejudice to a plaintiff’s filing of
an amended complaint.”  Printing Mart-
Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 563
A.2d 31, 48 (N.J. 1989).  This principle,
however, while framed in general terms, is
addressed to the “sufficiency of facts
alleged in a complaint,” id. at 34.
(emphasis added), and has little, if any,
bearing on pure determinations of law.  As
we conclude in the next section that Judge
Fratto denied ITT’s proposed amendments
on legal grounds, it follows that a
subsequent suit on the same legal theory
would be barred.  
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2. Should the State Court Have
Refrained from Considering the Merits
of the Proposed Amended Complaint?
We have concluded that Judge
Fratto intended to dispose of ITT’s
proposed amendments on the merits, and
that a judgment by the state court on
substantive grounds triggers Rooker-
Feldman regardless whether it is labeled
“with prejudice.”  These conclusions do
not, however, get Intelnet home.  In Gulla,
we held that the District Court had
jurisdiction to hear a claim addressed by
the state court because the latter, though it
purported to decide the merits of the
plaintiff’s claims, should not have done so
under Pennsylvania law.  Gulla, 146 F.3d
at 172 (“Under Pennsylvania law, the court
could not resolve the merits of the
[plaintiffs’] claims if they lack standing to
bring their suit.”).   Judge Fratto’s denial
of the proposed amendment precludes
federal jurisdiction over ITT’s RICO
claims only if state law authorized him to
decide the motion on the merits.
Accordingly, we turn yet again to New
Jersey law.  
New Jersey Rule 4:9-1 provides
that motions for leave to amend “shall be
freely given in the interest of justice.”  A
court nonetheless retains discretion to deny
an amendment under appropriate
circumstances.  Kernan v. One Washington
Park Urban Renewal Assocs., 713 A.2d
411, 421 (N.J. 1998).  ITT points to a
substantial body of New Jersey case law
addressing whether a court, in determining
whether to grant a motion to amend, may
consider the merits of the amendment.
See, e.g., Hansen v. Hansen, 770 A.2d
1278, 1286 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001); Interchange State Bank v. Rinaldi,
696 A.2d 744, 752 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1997); City Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Nat’l State Bank, 582 A.2d 809, 811 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).  These cases
do indeed limit a court’s freedom to
consider substantive issues in ruling on a
motion to amend.  See, e.g., Rinaldi, 696
A.2d at 752 (stating that a motion for leave
to amend should ordinarily be decided
“without consideration of the ultimate
merits of the amendment”).  
Nonetheless, New Jersey case law
is explicit that there are no firm rules
prohibiting consideration of the merits in
these cases.  “[C]ourts are free to refuse
leave to amend when the newly asserted
claim is not sustainable as a matter of law.
In other words, there is no point to
permitting the filing of an amended
pleading when a subsequent motion to
dismiss must be granted.”  Rinaldi, 696
We need not resolve these nuances
of New Jersey law because we have
determined that ITT’s state and federal
claims are substantially the same.
Consequently, under New  Jersey
preclusion law, a second action would be
barred regardless whether Judge Fratto
previously denied them on factual or legal
grounds and regardless whether the
dismissal was with prejudice.  For even a
judgment that is without prejudice has
preclusive effect with respect to a
“subsequent suit between the same parties,
asserting the same claims, based on the
same facts in state court.” Velasquez, 589
A.2d at 144. 
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A.2d at 752 (quoting Mustilli v. Mustilli,
681 A.2d 650 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1995)).  Denial of an amendment for
failure to state a claim should be examined
under the standard applicable to a motion
to dismiss under New Jersey Rule 4:6-2(e).
 See Maxim Sewerage Corp. v. Monmouth
Ridings, 640 A.2d 1216, 1219 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1993) (citing Banks v. Wolk,
918 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1990)), which
“requires treating all the allegations of the
pleading as true, and considering only
whether those allegations are legally
sufficient to establish the necessary
elements of the claimed cause of action.”
It is in this context that our earlier
examination of whether Judge Fratto
denied ITT’s motion to amend its
counterclaims for legal reasons becomes
important.  As already noted,  there is little
doubt that he denied ITT’s proposed
amendment as a matter of law.  After
examining ITT’s lengthy allegations and
hearing counsel at argument, Judge Fratto
concluded, “[A]t best it seems that the
allegation is . . . that the plaintiffs were
unable to fulfill their contract, and every
time they wrote a letter or sent a wire,
knowing that they were unable to fulfill
their contract, the[y] committed a RICO
violation.”  He continued, “I don’t think
RICO is or was intended to encompass
breaches of contract, even breaches of
contract that involve $800 million.”18  He
explicitly construed the claims in a light
most favorable to the moving party (“at
best it seems”).  Judge Fratto denied the
amendment based on his conviction that
    18Judge Fratto appears subtly to have
misstated the theory advanced by ITT in
federal court—that Intelnet violated RICO
by seizing on a pretextual breach to
threaten litigation.  Based on this
language, one might argue that the state
court did not “actually litigate” the claim
advanced by ITT in federal court because
Judge Fratto misconstrued ITT’s
allegations.  We hesitate to parse the
language in this fashion, given that ITT
explained its RICO theory to the state
court in the same terms as in the federal
litigation.  We construe Judge Fratto’s
reference to “breaches of contract” as
convenient shorthand for the alleged
scheme.  According to ITT, Intelnet used
the United States mail (a) fraudulently to
induce the ITT parties to execute their
agreements, (b) consistently to postpone
performance while concealing its inability
to perform, with the purpose (c) of seizing
upon pretexts to declare that ITT had
breached the agreements and extorting
settlements.  There was extensive
discussion at the motion hearing as to what
these allegations entailed, and Judge Fratto
likely believed his oral summation was
adequate against that backdrop.
In any case, this strategy is
unavailing because it runs up against the
“inextricably intertwined” prong of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  If Judge Fratto
denied ITT’s proposed amendment
because he concluded, whatever his
reasoning, that it failed to state a claim
upon which relief might be granted, a
federal judgment permitting a substantially
identical claim to proceed would render
the state court decision necessarily
erroneous.
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ITT had failed to state a claim as a matter
of law, and he had the discretion to do so
u n d e r  N e w  J e r s e y  l a w . 1 9
    19ITT raises a final objection to Rooker-
Feldman based on the non-identity of the
parties in the state versus federal actions.
(Various Intelnet affiliates are defendants
in the federal case but were not parties in
the New Jersey action, and ITT affiliates
that were named defendants in state court
are not plaintiffs in the federal action.)
The argument finds some support in our
decision in Valenti v. Mitchell, 962 F.2d
288 (3d Cir. 1992).  In that case, we
declined to apply Rooker-Feldman against
plaintiffs who were not parties to the state
action.  Relying on the “close affinity”
between the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and
claim and issue preclusion, we explained
that “[w]e [had] found no authority which
would extend the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine to persons not parties to the
proceedings before the state . . . court.”  Id.
at 297.
 However, the “close affinity”
between the Rooker-Feldman and
preclusion doctrines that supported federal
jurisdiction in Mitchell undercuts ITT’s
theory that Rooker-Feldman does not
apply in this case.  We did not decide in
V a l e n t i  w h e t h e r  t h e  R o o k e r -
Feldman jurisdictional bar can be asserted
by a non-party to the state court action
against a party to both proceedings.  In the
preclusion context, however, the rule is
quite clear.  While res judicata may
require total identity of the parties,
collateral estoppel usually requires only
that the party against whom preclusion is
being sought participated in the prior
p roceed i n g .  S e e ,  e .g . ,  Dic i  v .
Pennsylvania, 91 F.3d 542, 548 (3d Cir.
1996).  
We see no reason why a different
rule should govern Rooker-Feldman.  On
several occasions, to be sure, we have
declined to apply Rooker-Feldman to bar
a federal claim by a non-party to a state
action.  For example, in Marks v. Stinson,
19 F.3d 873, 885 n.11 (3d Cir. 1994), we
held that “Rooker-Feldman [does] not bar
the district court from hearing the claims
of the [] plaintiffs because they were not
parties to any of the state court
proceedings on the matter.”  Similarly, in
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v.
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission,
342 F.3d 242, 257 (3d Cir. 2003), we
noted that “[a] state court order to which
[the plaintiff] was not a party cannot be the
basis to deny [the plaintiff] its statutory
right to a federal forum.” Id.  But we have
n e v e r  d e e m e d  R o o k e r- Fe ld m an
inapplicable based on the non-participation
in state court of a party asserting the
jurisdictional bar.  On the contrary,  we
have applied Rooker-Feldman to bar a
federal claim by a plaintiff whose state
proceeding was non-adversarial (in other
words, there was apparently no defendant
at the state level).  The parties to the
federal action in that case were necessarily
non-identical.  See E.B. v. Verniero, 119
F.3d 1077, 1092 (3d Cir. 1997).
In this case, ITT lost in state court:
Judge Fratto denied its motion to amend its
pleadings.  Now, after raising the same
claims in federal court, it asserts that
jurisdiction is appropriate because it has
named defendants who were not parties to
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III. Conclusion
We summarize as follows.  ITT
presented its RICO claims to the state
court in the form of a proposed pleading
amendment adding counterclaims.  New
Jersey law permits a state court to deny an
amendment on procedural grounds (such
as inordinate delay in filing) or because
the amendment fails to state a claim.  The
latter is treated like a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim and is a permissible
decision on the merits under state law and
thus for Rooker-Feldman purposes.  Judge
Fratto denied the amendment at least in
part on the ground that it failed, as a matter
of law, to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.  In this context, the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal
jurisdiction in this case.  Accordingly, we
vacate the decision of the District Court
and dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.  
the state court action.  We will not permit
a party to end-run the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine in this manner.  The opinion of
our Court in Saudi Basic Industries Corp.
v. Exxon Corp., No. 02-2130, ___ F.3d
___, ___ (3d Cir. 2004), borrowing from
preclusion concepts, concluded that
“[c]laims and issues decided against an
entity bind also its parties in privity” for
Rooker-Feldman purposes.  Per Saudi
Basic, ITT may not evade Rooker-
Feldman’s grasp by adding affiliates as
plaintiffs in the federal suit.  In a similar
vein, we now hold that Rooker-Feldman
bars jurisdiction where, as here, related but
non-identical defendants (the Intelnet
affiliates) were drawn into the federal
litigation by the parties (ITT Corp. and its
affiliates) against whom the state court
action was decided.
